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ack  from  Warsaw  to  the  immediate  realities  of  Brussels,  it  is  startling  to  see  how 
participants struggle to find a name, a sound bite, a catchy phrase, to describe COP 19. 
In the end we need to accept that it was a negotiating session for governments to make 
progress towards reaching a long-term and effective climate change agreement to replace the 
very logical, but no-longer politically palatable Kyoto Protocol. 
UNFCCC negotiations, and the COPs, are in fact negotiations of an economic agreement to 
address  an  environmental  problem.  We  are  reminded  of  this  through  the  main 
preoccupation in Brussels these days, namely competitiveness. Narrowed to the context of 
climate change, this could be translated into: “What is the impact of activities to address 
climate change on the competitive and economic welfare of the EU?” 
While  many  issues  are  being  negotiated  –  too  many,  both  political  and  technical  –  in  a 
heretically simplistic way a number of questions stand out:  
i)  Are the targets adequate and how do we reach environmentally adequate targets?  
ii)  Can one understand and compare what other Parties are promising to do to ensure that 
the level of effort is comparable and equitable, and that companies are not asked to do 
more than their competitors in other jurisdictions? Is there comparability and equity in 
the eyes of the beholder? 
iii) Do we understand what tools each country uses (what is available, what one gets as 
support)  to  ensure  that  no  one  country  (and  its  companies)  gets  an  easier  ride  or 
competitive advantage in meeting the commitment/promises that countries make. 
If an agreement is to be reached in 2015, these questions need to be answered. If they are not, 
there will be mistrust, fear of carbon leakage and the temptation to resort to protectionist 
measures to compensate for competitive disadvantage. 
This Commentary looks at the results of the Warsaw COP through the lens of these three 
questions, with a view to understanding how much the Warsaw COP contributed and where 
we stand two years ahead of Paris.  
But first, a bit of background. From a somewhat privileged perspective as a member of the 
Polish Presidency team, we can say that the Polish COP Presidency did not do so badly, 
especially considering the environment it was operating in. It addressed well the danger of 
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the  fall-out  from  the  overly  enthusiastic  gavelling  in  Doha,  which  blocked  the  SBI 
(Subsidiary  Body  for  Implementation,  one  of  two  permanent  subsidiary  bodies  to  the 
Convention) in June in Bonn. Under less able management, this issue could have derailed the 
whole COP.  
In addition, while the Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel  on Climate  Change  (Climate Change  2013:  The  Physical  Science 
Basis, Summary for Policymakers) increased the urgency for action, UNEP told us that the 
actions  to  close  the  gap  (both  in  terms  of  the  level  of  effort  and  enthusiasm)  remain 
inadequate.1 Nevertheless, the new direction in which Australia is moving, the new Japanese 
target and the removal of the COP President from his domestic duties in the middle of the 
High Level Segment certainly did not make things easier. One can argue that all this did not 
create a “can do” atmosphere.  
Echoes of Doha could be heard in the form of the negotiations under Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the 
KP – covering modalities for accounting under the Second Commitment Period (SCP) of the 
Kyoto  Protocol  (KP)  –  and  which  could  not  be  concluded  in  Warsaw.  After  the  Doha 
Amendment,  completing  this  technical  part  is  necessary  for  the  operationalisation  of  the 
SCP. This left KP business unfinished and will continue as an issue that has its origin in the 
decisions and process in Doha.  
This has now become an issue for Ukraine, which seems to want to be part of the SCP and is 
affected  by  how  the  amount  of  AAUs,  it  receives  is  calculated.  This  can  be  resolved  by 
Ukraine accepting a significant loss of AAUs, which will have implications for its post-2015 
starting position, or its departure from the SCP. The later scenario would also translate into a 
disappearance of JI supply from the carbon market, not a negative prospect for some. Finally, 
if  the  Ukrainians  dig  their  heels  in  (an  unlikely  scenario),  it  could  lead  to  gridlock  in 
operationalising the KP.   
Hopefully,  this  issue,  and  the  sensitivities  around  Doha,  will  be  resolved  in  the  coming 
months, but it will require attention and management. It will not happen on its own, and it 
may  re-emerge  as  part  of  a  further  push  to  come  up  with  rules  of  procedures  to  make 
decisions in the UNFCCC. In Warsaw, there was an initial exchange of views (led jointly by 
Poland and Peru) that will continue in June.  
We did observe a notably more positive stance from the US, which is certainly heartening, 
and gives all great hope. But we also heard language reminiscent of the divide a few years 
back between developed and developing countries, historical responsibility and unfulfilled 
commitments from the so-called ‘Like-Minded Group’, which one can only hope is a simple 
negotiating tactic. 
To provide transparency in commitments, one of the three issues mentioned above, this COP 
moved forward the process for arriving at a set of results that would ensure: 
  A clear timetable (by Q1 2015, if possible) and  
  Consistent ways (to be defined by the next COP) for different countries to present 
what they propose to deliver in terms of GHG mitigation efforts post-2020. 
In  this  respect,  the  Warsaw  COP  can  claim success.  The  timetable  will  also  provide  the 
opportunity to assess these promises, although there is no clear process in place to do that 
yet. 
                                                   
1 See the UN Environment Programme’s Emissions Gap report 
(www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport2013/). 
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The  last-minute  compromise  introduced  in  the  Ad  hoc  Working  Group  on  the  Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) text by the use of the word “contributions” instead of 
“commitments” to describe what countries will have to put forward, does not detract from 
the  most  significant  change,  namely  the  fact  that  it  only  refers  to  all  Parties,  with  no 
differentiation.  This  moves  the  discussion  away  from  distinguishing  developed  from 
developing countries (which characterised the Kyoto Protocol) in the type of contribution 
that they need to make (and in UNFCCC text, in separate paragraphs). The language in the 
ADP is still soft, and constructively ambiguous, but it provides a way forward.  
Some see in the ADP a move away from the so-called ‘top-down’ approach (KP approach), to 
a more ‘hybrid approach’ where countries define what they do in accordance with some 
common and understandable rule and there is some solution (not at all clear yet) on what to 
do with the gap between the 20C and the aggregate of pledges.  
While there is some truth in that, in reality the KP was never a top-down model that divided 
a global emissions pie according to a formula. It always had a bottom up approach, in that 
countries put forward negotiating positions. In the end, the 2015 pledges will also be the 
result of negotiations.  
Besides the fact that the idea of budgets and AAUs disappears, the change is in the reality 
that everyone must do its part (developed and developing). 
In this respect, the Warsaw COP managed to finalise the rules for Measurement Reporting 
and Verification (MRV) and to agree on the specifications of how to analyse the biennial 
reports from developing countries through international consultation and analysis (ICA). 
There  were  other  difficult  issues  that  were  addressed,  such  as  the  so-called  “Loss  and 
Damage” that would allow vulnerable countries to address the impacts of climate change. 
While a “Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage” was established, it did not 
have the economic element that some, especially the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 
wanted. It was, in the end, subsumed under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, giving it a 
different orientation, but with a review at COP 22 in 2016. 
Finance, always an important issue at COPs, saw the first guidance to the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF) and saw developed countries agreeing to submit new biennial reports on how 
they  will  ramp  up  climate  finance.    However,  no  concrete  progress  was  made  on  the 
mobilisation of the $100 billion promised in 2009. 
While  at  least  some  progress  was  made  on  issues  that  would  provide  clarity  and 
transparency as to what countries will promise to do, what was noticeable was the lack of 
progress on issues that will allow countries to understand what tools are at their disposal to 
meet these commitments – and provide transparency on that. 
There  was  one  big  success  with  the  results  on  REDD+  (Reducing  Emissions  from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation). No less than seven decisions (five on methodological 
aspects, one on REDD finance and one on coordination of finance) were taken. This included 
a methodological framework for results-based payments and coordination and tracking of 
REDD+ finance, which makes moving to the third phase possible. We also saw a number of 
countries pledge $280 million towards REDD+ activities. 
However, progress in REDD+, among other items, continues to be held back by the inability 
to make progress on the role of markets, and its cousin, accounting issues. How these two 
issues relate to each other, where they should be discussed and the proper timing between 
them hamper progress.  4 | ANDREI MARCU 
 
There can be little doubt about the significant efforts that the Polish Presidency has made in 
ensuring progress on markets, focusing on the so-called Framework for Various Approaches 
(FVA). The FVA is part of the trio of initiatives that have been lumped together and that also 
include New Market Mechanisms (NMM) and Non-Market Approaches (NMA). 
It  must  be  understood  that  the  FVA  is  seen  as  one  of  the  central  elements  of  the  2015 
agreement, and in general as a move in the direction of decentralisation, with countries using 
a diversity of approaches. The FVA could be seen, in this scenario, as serving a number of 
functions, such as: 
  Quality  control,  by  ensuring  that  domestically  created  reduction  units,  used 
internationally for UNFCCC compliance, meet minimum agreed standards, and  
  Coordination, by tracking units and avoiding double counting in issuance and use for 
compliance. 
On the other hand, New Market Mechanisms, which, after recent discussions in Bonn, may 
now  seem  to  cover  a  great  variety  of  approaches,  have  no  clear  definition  or  common 
elements, other than the fact that:  
  They  cover  broad  sectors  of  the  economy  (as  opposed  to  CDM,  which  is  project 
oriented) and 
  They are created and run by the COP, just like a broader and more flexible CDM, in 
essence a more centralised approach than the FVA. 
There was a strong interest in achieving progress on markets, and FVA in particular, and it 
found strong and vocal support from significant groups, ranging from:  
  AILAC (Peru, Colombia, Chile et al.),  
  Umbrella Group (Japan, US, New Zealand, et al.),  
  EIG (Switzerland, Mexico, RoK, et al.),  
  Coalition for Rainforest Nations (41 countries interested in a REDD+ mechanism, and 
led by PNG), and  
  complemented, to a limited degree, by support from Ecuador and 
  Brazil,  which  could  support  a  “transparency  platform”  in  Warsaw  in  order  to 
understand what initiatives were being undertaken, but not go further. 
At the same time there was an array of Parties that did not want to make progress, for a 
variety  of  reasons  –  politics  make  for  strange  bedfellows.  In  no  particular  order  of 
importance, these reasons include: 
  Some are ideologically opposed to markets in the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC is seen as a 
non-market approach. The FVA is lumped with markets, and seen as providing an 
avenue for markets to enter the UNFCCC. 
  Some recognise the importance and centrality of the FVA in the 2015 agreement, and 
think  that  any  outcome  on  the  FVA  will  predetermine  the  outcome  for  the  2015 
agreement.  
  Progress in the FVA is tied to progress on finance and other issues to which they attach 
importance – this item is a viewed as a “give to get”. 
  Some  remain  unconvinced  that  a  decentralised  system  can  deliver  quality,  and 
therefore prefer a more centralised approach. Based on the experience with the CDM, 
some see quality control for compliance units as critical.  
  The  FVA  is  an  accounting  tool/accounting,  and  discussions  under  the  FVA  are  a 
surrogate  for  accounting  discussions.  In  short,  no  progress  on  accounting,  no 
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Early on in Warsaw it became clear that all that could be accomplished was a “Transparency 
Platform” that would collect information in a consistent and comparable way on the market 
and non-market mitigation approaches that are taking place around the world. The COP 
Presidency had put forward this idea earlier in the year, and Brazil had vigorously made it 
the main possible outcome in Warsaw. 
This very modest outcome succumbed to the determination of those who did not want any 
progress to happen and who used, or threatened to use, procedural fights to prevent any 
decision. Those who wanted a decision in the end found that a bloody Pyrrhic victory was a 
poor  return  on  political  capital  and  recommended  dropping  the  item  when  the  COP 
President undertook further consultations in the second week. 
There are, however, important conclusions to be drawn from the COP in Warsaw. 
  First, while many feel that we can only make progress in addressing climate when we 
start pricing the GHG externality in the economy, no significant decisions were taken on 
markets in Warsaw. This needs to be addressed and resolved urgently. 
  The way forward in integrating national approaches in the UNFCCC was blocked in 
Warsaw,  and  it  is  now  seen  as  unlikely  that  any  progress  will  be  made  towards 
producing anything operational until 2015-16.  
  The exception was the modest result in the “Guidance to the CDM Executive Board” 
item, and a reference in the ADP text on the CDM (clean development mechanisms). 
Some feel that the ADP reference is potentially important, as it is the first reference to 
markets in the ADP and may contribute to a solution to ‘salvage’ the CDM. These are 
not  untrue  statements,  but  we  should  also  consider  that  the  CDM  is  seen  as  non- 
threatening, associated with the KP, and as such, politically acceptable. Also, while the 
importance of salvaging the CDM and preserving the KP markets infrastructure cannot, 
and  should  not  in  any  way  be  minimised,  it  cannot  overshadow  the  importance  of 
moving forward with Markets 2.0 – the integration of national approaches under the 
UNFCCC. 
It is also worth mentioning that the CMP (Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) Contact Group on “CMP Guidance to the CDM EB”, the 
scene  of  passionate  debates  in  the  past,  was  largely  devoid  of  energy,  with  the  notable 
exception  of  the proposal  from  Ecuador  to  remove  any  trade  barriers  on  CERs  (certified 
emissions reductions). Was this aimed at the EU ETS, or was it a more general trade matter? 
So,  against  this  background,  how  can  we  move  forward?  Further  efforts  at  the next  SBs 
(Subsidiary Bodies of the UNFCCC) in June 2014, and then in Lima, to move through the 
same triangle of FVA, NMM and NMA may produce some advances, but they are unlikely 
to lead to anything operational before 2015-16, at the earliest. 
The  Platform  that  was  discussed  in  Warsaw  should  be  created,  and  used  to  provide 
transparency on domestic initiatives. However, it should be much more than that. It should 
serve as a place where we take a step back, discuss the role of carbon pricing in the 2015 
agreement, and how to integrate domestic initiatives and existing (CDM & JI) and future 
(NMM, NMA) COP-led mechanisms under the UNFCCC. The future of CDM and JI cannot 
be discussed in isolation, separately from the relationship with NMM and NMA.  
This does not imply a new body or negotiating track, but should simply bring together items 
that are now being discussed separately, under different bodies in the UNFCCC. 
We should lay to rest the discussion on the difference between FVA and NMM, things have 
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will  be  decentralised,  with  space  for  domestically  run,  as  well  as  COP-run  mitigation 
approaches, all integrated.  
At the same time we should also recognise that the FVA negotiations are not about markets 
only, and would greatly benefit from not being seen as a ’market’ issue.  They are a much 
broader  exercise,  and  imply  a  reflection  on  how  to  unify,  keep  track  of  and  coordinate 
national actions that result in international transfers. But not everything belongs in there. 
Such a discussion can only take place once we stop ‘dumping’ other issues in the FVA.   
Every time a little progress seems possible, Parties start to include items that are important 
and related to the FVA, such as accounting, level of ambition, etc. – but that do not really 
belong in this discussion. The FVA discussion then becomes a microcosm of the UNFCCC, 
and, like the whole process, it becomes so broad that it gets bogged down. In my view, this is 
an effective way to slow things down, for some. 
It is imperative that we use the same language. Accounting is important, but what exactly do 
we mean by ‘accounting’? Is the FVA the legitimate place to discuss what gets counted, what 
is the desirable level of ambition, etc.? Or does this discussion more correctly belong in the 
place that makes decisions on commitments and ways to meet those commitments?  
Put simply, should the FVA discussion be about how to do the accounting, or “just” how to 
provide  the  information  for  the  accounting  system,  by  keeping  track  of  units,  avoiding 
double counting, etc.?  
Unless we start moving forward under the UNFCCC, solutions will be developed elsewhere, 
with the UNFCCC process being a “taker”. This is starting to happen with other initiatives, 
private and public, now seen as a better avenue to make progress.  